Quantitative vs Qualitative public investment: The case of Portuguese Manufacturing between 1988 and 1992 by Godinho Rodrigues, Antonio M C R
Quantitative vs. qualitative public investment: the case of
Portuguese manufacturing between 1988 and 1992
António M. C. R. Godinho Rodrigues
Centre for Spatial & Real Estate Economics
Department of Economics, University of Reading (Reino Unido)
Centre for Spatial and Real Estate Economics
Faculty of Urban & regional Studies




Tel: 00 44 118 9875123 (x.7361)




It is widely accepted that the injection of capital through state funding with little
considerations for particular structures of the industrial mix of a region is not sufficient in itself
to induce development. Neoclassic redistribution mechanisms which should lead in the long
term to an equitable distribution of wealth through the geographical plane do not work in
reality. Also, the failure of the traditional regional policies inspired by the growth pole logic has
led to a greater attention being given to the smaller geographical areas and to their particular
characteristics.
The coordination of industrial policy guidelines with regional development issues have
become of great importance in order to foster development in traditional backward regions. It is
the contention of this paper to argue that in the case of Portuguese manufacturing, government
measures have since accession to the European Community in 1986 been bias towards the
coastal area, increasing disparities rather than the opposite. This argument stands even when
considering the proportional differences in distribution of industrial activity throughout
continental Portugal.
Simply adding up public funds and comparing regional totals is not enough to perform a
realistic analysis. In the present study, data from the total number of projects approved within
the Pedip framework is analysed taking into consideration the innovative character of specific
Pedip sub-measures. It will be argued that through concentrating most of the qualitative
investment (e.g. Operational Programme 5) in the coastal core, the government further
undermined the development of new industrial areas in the interior.1
1. Introduction
The main contention of the present paper is that Pedip 1, as the main financial
instrument within the Government’s Industrial Policy framework was spatially
extremely bias; the greater the industrial presence in one region, the greater the financial
aid towards industrial firms in that region. It could be argued that, since the whole
programme was designed by the Portuguese government not as an instrument which
should tackle regional imbalances, the spatial distribution of the projects approved
within Pedip 1 simply reflected the different weight of industrial sectors as a whole
throughout the spatial plane. There are however two clear ways of refuting such an
argument. First, Pedip 1 was indeed intended to tackle regional differences within the
country, as it was originally designed; second, even taking into consideration the spatial
differences in industrial distribution within Portugal as a whole, one can see the Pedip 1
still favoured the richer regions. The second point will be developed in the presence
exercise. Also, it will be taken one step forward. It will be argued that measures which
could induce greater increases in industrial productivity at the spatial level were focused
merely on a very small number of regions.
In the next section, Pedip will be briefly introduced. Next, some important
considerations will be made about the spatial distribution of industrial activity in
Portugal. Section 4 will discuss the regional discrepancies in the implementation of
Operational Programmes 3.1 and OP 5 at the national level, while the next section will
do the same but concentrating only in the Norte region. The paper will terminate with
some brief conclusions and suggestions for future research.
2. Pedip
Pedip 1, which run from 1988 to 1992, was innovative from the national point of view
but also when considering the programme within a wider framework, that of the
European Union Regional Policy. Pedip was engineered within the spirit of the 1988
reform, which left behind the idea of concentrating the use of the available financial
instruments in particular projects towards the broader use of specific guidelines, which
came to practice in a number of Operational Programmes (OPs), which themselves,
would provide the guidelines for individual project support. On the other hand, specific
OPs would be part of broader policy guidelines, and the practical framework for these
would be provided by structured programmes; such was the case of Pedip, a programme2
which involved the coordination of several structural instruments, most notably the
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF).
One point which is important to bear in mind, although not being further explored in the
present paper is related to the implications of classifying the Portuguese territory as one
Objective 1 region. In practice, the implicit consequences are that any EU programme,
formulated within the objectives of increasing regional competitiveness through
tackling regional disparities, is incorporated into national objectives, without any
regional content. Also, the non-existence of decentralised centres of decision-making is
an obvious obstacle to the effectiveness of such programmes, in terms of spatial
inequalities. So, it is important to clarify the fact that Pedip was intended as a Regional
Policy instrument but in practice gave the financial backing to pursue highly centralised
policy objectives.
Taking the previous point into account, Pedip will be analysed as a national programme,
intended to improve the competitiveness of the Portuguese industry, and without any
objectives at the spatial level. From here, the starting preposition is that the proportion
of funding going into each region should be coherent with the spatial distribution of
industrial firms. Within such a framework, regional disparities would naturally continue
to increase, although the state would not be responsible for this movement
1. However,
as it will be shown, Pedip was disproportionally bias towards richer regions, helping to
accelerate in effect differences between regions with a  richer industrial mix, in
detriment not only of the more rural areas, but also of some old industrial areas.
The main focus of the analysis are two specific Operational Programmes, part of Pedip:
OP 3.1 (SINPEDIP) and Operational Programme 5. OP 3.1 was in purely financial
terms the most important programme, with 52.7% of all incentives given to the
approved projects. SINPEDIP dealt mainly with production line upgrades through the
acquisition of new equipment; it can be characterised as a  traditional and  orthodox
financial instrument created to tackle basic deficiencies at the firm level. On the other
hand, OP 5 was the most innovative measure in terms of its focus and the specific
                                                          
1 It is assumed as given that, contrary to the old neo-classic arguments that markets would in the end lead
to an efficient distribution of resources throughout the spatial plane, regional disparities increase within a
free market economy3
nature of the programmes approved; it dealt mainly with what became known as
productivity missions. Its backbone were the Demonstration Actions (OP 5A1) and the
creation of specialised Consulting Centres, both with the explicit objective of spreading
know-how throughout competing firms of the same industrial sectors; this would result
in relatively localised technological spillovers. In terms of value-added, the impact
within any targeted industrial cluster was intended to be significant.
As a result of the characteristic described above, OP3.1 and OP5 were chosen, since
they were seen in policy and operational terms as opponents. The former followed a
more traditional line of direct incentives to industrial firms, while the latter considered
specific aspects which affect industrial firms’ productivity. Taking as the starting point
the proportional distribution of industrial activity throughout the different regions of the
Portuguese territory (at different scales), the distribution of the number of projects
approved within the scope of the two OPs chosen should be roughly the same, if Pedip
was spatially unbiased. If not, and particularly, if the differences between the spatial
distribution of firms and that of OP3.1 projects first and OP5 second is considerably
different with the latter being higher than the former, then one should conclude the
Pedip 1, as the main financial instrument within the state’s industrial policy served as a
way of accelerating disparities between Portuguese regions.
3. Spatial Distribution of Industrial Firms
In order to analyse the distribution of industrial activity throughout the national plane,
the regional desegregation levels were, first the NUTS 3 level (28 regions) and second
the council (“concelhos”) level; the latter will serve mainly to show that even within
small areas as NUTS3 regions, the spatial distribution of industrial activity can be
significantly different
2; also, only the  Norte region will be analysed at the more
desegregated level since data for all the other spatial units is not presently available. The
main focus will be the number of firms (taken from the SISED database). This value
will be weighted by the area in squared kilometres of each region, multiplied by 1000
3,
giving thus the number of firms per Km
2. Only industrial firms will be considered
                                                          
2 This fact is natural when considering the heterogeneous nature of the Portuguese spatial plane.
3 The reason for doing this transformation is that the size of each region differs considerably.4
(CAE1 15-37). Since Pedip run from 1988 until 1992, the average number of firms per
squared kilometre was calculated for this period
4.
Map 1
An analysis of map 1 where the number of industrial firms weighted by the area of each
region in Km
2 is represented, shows that first, the main industrial pole is situated in and
around Grande Porto. Another strong industrial area is in and around Grande Lisboa.
Also, it is quite obvious that the interior regions, especially those situated in the south,
are poorly industrialised. Finally, it is also relevant to notice that industrial activity is
not equally distributed along the main motorway, the A1, which links the two largest
urban centres, Lisbon and Oporto.
                                                          
4 One alternative approach would be to use the number of firms of a latter period, taking into account the
time lags involved since the moment each project is approved until when it actually affects industrial
output. However, since in the present analysis what is relevant is the point of view of the decision-maker
at the time when each project is approved, such lags were not considered.5
At this point, it is also relevant to analyse the weight of industrial firms in the total
population of firms in each region. This analysis will take into account only the norte
region, and will be done at the next level of spatial desegregation, concelhos.
Map 2
Map 2 shows the distributions of all firms in the concelhos of the north of Portugal
(again, weighted by the area). Grande Porto, as the largest urban centre in the norte, has
a much higher score than the rest, since it is where most of the services are located. If
we now focus our attention at Map 3, the picture is quite different. Here the proportion
of industrial firms in each concelho is shown. As we can see, the score of Grande Porto
is quite low, compared with the neighbouring regions. The coastal area is obviously the
most industrialised. Also, it is interesting to note the existence of some industrial nodes
in the interior (e.g. Murça and Armamar). As mentioned in a previous section, this
analysis shows how heterogeneous the country is in terms of distribution of economic
activity.6
Map 3
4. Implementation of OP 3.1 and OP 5
Some considerations should be made about the dataset used, before proceeding. The
original dataset, supplied by the Pedip Office, included all the projects approved within
the scope of the programme. From one of the fields,  concelho, it was possible to
determine to which NUT3 region each targeted firm belonged to. Some projects were
deleted from the list, since the field concelho was empty; this does not represent a
problem because first, the number of projects was not very significant (449 out of a total
of 7326; second, most of the entities involved were public institutions; third, the
regional distributions of these 449 projects (in terms of districts) was similar to that of
Pedip as a whole.
The first step was to determine whether general relations existed, at the NUT3 level,
between the total number of industrial firms (weighted by the size of each region) and
the total number OP 3.1 and OP 5 projects. All regions were given a ranking score
according to several variables and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficients were
calculated to evaluate the relation between several pairs of variables. The Spearman
Coefficients were calculated using the following formula:7
Where:
N is the total number of regions.
x and y are the variables rankings.
Table 1 shows the Superman coefficients obtained for the following relations
Table1
relationships rspearman
<ent> * <op3.1+op5> 0.66
<ent> * <op3.1 > 0.69
<ent> * < op5> 0.56
Several interesting results are obtained. First, the relationship between the number of
firms, ent, and the total number of projects per NUT3 regions, op3.1+op5, is strong, as
it would be expected (the spatial distribution of projects and the location of industrial
firms are naturally correlated). More importantly are the next two coefficients: the first,
which shows the relation between OP3.1 projects and total number of industrial firms,
indicate that a stronger correlation exists than with the previous relationship; we can
then conclude that the spatial distribution of the more traditional financial instruments,
with less coordination between policy objectives, is more coherent with the spatial
distribution of firms, and then more regionally unbiased. The third coefficient shows
exactly the opposite in relation to the distribution of OP5 projects. We can then
conclude that in respect with measures with a more innovative content, and which have
a greater potential in benefiting local economies, Pedip’s spatial distribution was more
incoherent in respect to the real distribution of industrial entities.
The next step is to try to explain the variation between the OP3.1 and OP5 distribution
in relation with the total number of industrial firms. A new variable will be created,
which will basically represent what the spatial distribution of projects should be,













be variables (wsb) are calculated by comparing the regional proportions in relation to
the variable ent, and apply those same proportions in respect to the total number of
projects approved per region.
The main formula for calculating the WSBs is:
Which can be simplified to give:
Table 2 shows the total and percentage for ent, followed by the WSBs for OP3.1 and
OP5, compared with each of the Operational programmes total. As an example, for
Minho Lima (codnut 10101), the total number of approved projects (weighted by area)
according to the proportion of industrial firms present in the region should have been 52
(2% of 2668,4), while the actual figure was 6,8. The basic rule for analysing the WSB
scores is that those regions with a WSB smaller than the actual number of approved
projects were favoured by that particular Operational Programme; the opposite
conclusion applies to those regions where the WSB score is smaller than the actual
























ent OP 3.1 OP 5
codnut nº of firms % nº of projects approved wsb nº of projects approved wsb
10101 30 2,0 6,8 52,0 0,5 7,9
10102 23 1,5 1,5 39,9 0,1 6,1
10103 208 13,5 111,1 360,9 6,4 54,7
10104 328 21,3 376,5 569,1 13,7 86,3
10105 357 23,2 819,7 619,4 104,0 93,9
10106 80 5,2 30,8 138,8 4,6 21,0
10107 6 0,4 1,7 10,4 1,0 1,6
10108 28 1,8 385,3 48,6 24,4 7,4
10201 53 3,4 211,4 92,0 12,7 13,9
10202 17 1,1 13,5 29,5 2,3 4,5
10203 23 1,5 1,2 39,9 0,0 6,1
10204 37 2,4 20,7 64,2 1,1 9,7
10205 5 0,3 49,0 8,7 9,2 1,3
10206 23 1,5 9,6 39,9 1,5 6,1
10207 8 0,5 5,8 13,9 2,9 2,1
10208 13 0,8 109,7 22,6 12,1 3,4
10209 10 0,7 1,0 17,3 0,0 2,6
10210 8 0,5 1,1 13,9 0,5 2,1
10301 38 2,5 24,4 65,9 1,6 10,0
10302 85 5,5 6,6 147,5 1,2 22,4
10303 38 2,5 52,5 65,9 10,0 10,0
10304 59 3,8 375,4 102,4 184,8 15,5
10305 33 2,1 44,1 57,3 7,9 8,7
10401 3 0,2 1,9 5,2 0,7 0,8
10402 4 0,3 2,5 6,9 0,1 1,1
10403 10 0,7 1,3 17,3 0,6 2,6
10404 2 0,1 0,5 3,5 0,2 0,5
10501 9 0,6 3,0 15,6 0,4 2,4
Total 1538 100 2668,4 2668,4 404,6 404,6
In order to pinpoint the precise relation between WSBs and actual scores, it is best to
represent graphically the results. For this, the total number of firms per region, together
with the number of projects approved for each of the two OPs were indexed in relation
to each of the columns’ total (ient for the former, iOP3.1 and iOP5 for the latter); both
iOP3.1 and iOP5 were subtracted from ient and the results represented graphically.
                                                          











NUTS 3 ordenados (crescente) por número de empresas
op 3.1
op5
From figure 1 it is possible to conclude first that a large number of regions have positive
but low values, which show that for most NUT3 areas the number of projects approved
was smaller than what should have been, according to the distribution of industrial firms
spatially. On the other hand, a number of areas register high negative scores, showing
that these were highly benefited from OP 3.1 and 5. Also, as the number of firms
increase, so does the difference to the WSB scores. Towards the right hand of the
graphic is where the most extreme values occur, showing a cluster of regions with
higher values, which mean that these group of regions were far from well represented in
OP 3.1 and OP 5. Finally, it is possible to see that differences from 0 are generally
greater for OP 5 than for OP 3. Further considerations will be made when analysing the
graphical representation of each OP separately.11





















NUTS3 ordenados (crescente) por número de empresas
Figure 2 and 3 represent the difference between WSB scores and actual values for OP
3.1 and OP 5 respectively.



















NUTS3 ordenados (crescente) por número de empresas
From here it is possible to see that in relation to OP 3.1, Pinhal Litoral (10208), Entre
Douro e Vouga (10108), Grande Lisboa (10304) and Grande Porto (10105) were the12
most favoured regions, while  Tamega (10106),  Lezíria do Tejo (10302),  Cavado
(10103) and Ave (10104) are the most under-represented regions.
In relation to OP 5, one region stands out as being extremely over-represented in
relation to the proportion of industrial firms; that is Grande Lisboa (10304). The group
which is mostly worse-off is the same as in OP3.1; it is also important to note that
Grande Porto (10105) is not as over-represented as it could be expected.
The two figures above, when seen together, should be analysed with care, due to
different scale represented. In order to get a clear idea of the difference between both
OP’s total in relation to the distribution of industrial firms in space, an index of
variation (from the WSB scores) can be constructed, simply by using the following
formula:
Thus, the index of variation for OP 3.1 is 0.79 while for OP 5 is 1.06. This show again
that SINPEDIP respected more the spatial distribution of industrial activity, when
compared with OP 5. So, the general conclusion from this simple, but effective analysis
is that generally, in relation to more innovative measures, Pedip favoured a small group
of regions in detriment of the rest.
Although it is not the objective of the present exercise to find reasons for the variations
found above, it is important nonetheless to show the results found when comparing the
values for OP5 with a small number of variables which could help to shed some light in
the matter. One first hypothesis was to calculate the Public Leverage ratios (PLr)
6 for all
regions. Again, using the Spearman correlation coefficients, no important relation was
found. The sane cannot be said however in relation to the total value added for each
region. When comparing the regional ranking according to VAB with the OP 5 rankings
                                                          
6 Public Leverage ratios simply should how much public funds must be given to induce a certain value of
private investment, and are calculated by dividing Public incentives by private investment for each
project, sum and average for each region.
￿ - = | | iOP iWSB iv13
a coefficient of 0.71 was determined, which show a clear relation between these two
figures.
5. OP 3.1 and OP 5 in the Norte
At the more desegregated level, some of the trends identified above should become
more clear. First of all, map 4 shows the overall picture of the Northern area or




Naturally, there are strong similarities between the distribution of industrial firms and
the distribution of all firms shown in map 2, although a careful analysis of the two maps
show a more evenly distribution of industrial activity.
In the case of the region  Norte, it is not possible to compare, using Spearman
coefficients, the spatial distribution of the approved projects under OP 3.1 and OP 5
with the distribution of industrial firms, because a significant number of the scores is the
same, which invalidates any possible ranking. However, it was possible to calculate,
also following the same methodology used above, the what should be variables (WSB),
and represent graphically the differences between the indexed WSBs for each OP and
the actual number of projects (also indexed). Figure 4 shows both the values for OP 3.1
and OP 5 in order to find common patterns.14
Figure 4










Regions ordered by ent
OP 3.1
OP 5
It is possible to see that, as with the NUTS3 analysis, as we move along the x axis,
differences from the wsb scores begin to increase. Also, the number of firms which
were favoured by OP 3.1 was greater than those under OP5 (more negative values). On
the other hand, the most extreme values were registered in OP5. Again, this results are
coherent with the previous analysis, showing that projects approved under OP 5
favoured a smaller number of regions. The following two graphics give a greater weight
to the conclusions reached above. Clearly in relation to OP 3.1 the spatial distribution of
approved projects show more discrepancies than in relation to OP 5 where it is possible
to observe that roughly the regions which are highly industrialised loose out in terms of
the number of approved projects. The two extreme values are Póvoa de Varzim and São
João da Madeira. On the other hand, Porto was extremely favoured by Operational
Programme 5. Still, the most important point to bear in mind is that, while in relation to
OP 3.1 there is a considerable number of both positive and negative scores, in relation
to OP 5, there is a significant number of high positive values, but only one highly
negative; this is precisely the region which was more favoured under Operation
Programme 5.15








NUTS3 ordenados (crescente) por número de empresas










NUTS3 ordenados (crescente) por número de empresas
6. Exploring possible relationships
Following the same line of thought introduced in section 4, this section will explore
some possible explanations of the spatial distribution of Pedip. With this end in mind,
an econometric model was constructed using as the dependent variable the number of
approved projects from both OP 3.1 and OP 5; the data used corresponded to the 84
concelhos of the  Norte. Three independent variables were included in the model
7:
<ent1990> (number of firms in 1990 per council); <asf90> (average size of industrial
firm in 1990 per council); <topo_vab> (value-added variable)
8.
The functional relationship tested was the following:
Where a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables is
assumed to exist.
Below we can see the results of the first model; the first obvious conclusion is that,
although the general fit is acceptable, one of the variables, asf90 is not significant and
should therefore be excluded from the model. The results of this incorrect equation are
                                                          
7 In the choice of independent variables, a preliminary analysis with simple correlation coefficients was
performed, which excluded two variables which the author thought could help explain the spatial
distribution of Pedip. These two variables were <risi>, an index of specialisation and the PL ratios for
each council.
8 See appendix 2 for a detailed description of the value-added variable.
) _ , 90 , 1990 ( 5 / 31 vab topo asf ent f op =16
however important since the exclusion of the average size of the firm raises some
theoretical considerations. The possibility that particular attention in the policy
orientation of Pedip was given to an incubator strategy can be refuted
9.
Number of obs =      84
F(  3,    80) =   69.30
Prob > F      =  0.0000
R-squared     =  0.7221
Adj R-squared =  0.7117
---------------------------------------------------
   op315 |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|
---------+-----------------------------------------
 ent1990 |   2.939193    .744372      3.949   0.000
topo_vab |    34.2844   4.007155      8.556   0.000
   asf90 |   .1719219   .3132492      0.549   0.585
   _cons |  -17.09018   6.141521     -2.783   0.007
-----------------------------------------------
A second model was then tested, where asf90 was excluded. The results, presented
below show an improvement in the overall fit of the model. These results completely
support the thesis presented in the present paper. Both the spatial distribution of the
firms (ent90) and the value added data are relevant, but the coefficient of the latter is
considerably higher than that of the former. This high positive coefficient of the
topo_vab variable show that the nature of the industrial mix of each concelho, in terms
of value added was a factor of great importance in distributing Pedip incentives. Also,
value added data helps to explain the variation as shown by the wsb variables.
Number of obs =      84
F(  2,    81) =  104.70
Prob > F      =  0.0000
R-squared     =  0.7211
Adj R-squared =  0.7142
-------------------------------------------------
   op315 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|
---------+---------------------------------------
 ent1990 |   3.090579   .6883917     4.490  0.000
topo_vab |   35.20577   3.622813     9.718  0.000
   _cons |  -15.17203    5.02828    -3.017  0.003
---------------------------------------------
                                                          
9 This takes the simpler version of the incubator hypothesis, according to which the inclusion public
intervention should be directed to small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), preferably from dynamic
industrial sectors. This public incentives would spillover into further rounds of localised private
investment.17
As it is mentioned in Appendix II, the topo_vab variable includes the absolute values
from 1990 and the variation between 1990and 1994. In the next model the variable was
decomposed into its two components to see whether a greater emphasis was given to the
more dynamic sectors (those where the rate of change of the VA in the period analysed
was greater). The results are somewhat surprising; the rate of change in the value added
data is not significant in itself. The absolute values of VA (vab90) are significant,
although the value of the coefficient decease's greatly. This shows that in fact the
formula used for constructing topo_vab was the adequate. Also, this demonstrates that,
although the rate of change in VA (vab9094) in itself does not explain the variation in
the spatial distribution of OP 3.1 and OP 5, the most correct specification of the value
added variable should still include this factor
10.
Number of obs =      84
F(  3,    80) =   74.74
Prob > F      =  0.0000
R-squared     =  0.7370
Adj R-squared =  0.7272
---------------------------------------------------
   op315 |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|
---------+-----------------------------------------
 ent1990 |   2.803451   .6851975      4.091   0.000
   vab90 |    17.5325   1.769177      9.910   0.000
 vab9094 |   -4.21828   10.05206     -0.420   0.676
   _cons |   7.538322   11.40699      0.661   0.511
-----------------------------------------------
7. Conclusions
The main objective of the present paper was to highlight the centralised nature of
decision making in respect to the most important financial instrument available to help
restructuring industry in Portugal. It is the contention of the author that Pedip is a clear
example of poor coordination between different governmental bodies, each with a
different set of policy guidelines and objectives; in this case. Within this theoretical
framework, Pedip shows the incoherence between first, the goal of providing the
necessary means for the development of national industry, second the long-term
objective to achieve regional equality.
                                                          
10 A analysis of the graphical distribution of each variable show that the little significance of the vab9094
can be explained the particular form of this variable (polynomium of the third degree).18
At the time when the paper was concluded, research on this particular aspect of Pedip 1
was still on an early stage. It is expected by the author that more revealing results will










10108 ENTRE DOURO E VOUGA
10201 BAIXO VOUGA
10202 DAO LAFOES
10203 BEIRA INTERIOR NORTE
10204 SERRA DA ESTRELA
10205 BAIXO MONDEGO
10206 PINHAL INTERIOR NORTE
10207 COVA DA BEIRA
10208 PINHAL LITORAL
10209 PINHAL INTERIOR SUL
10210 BEIRA INTERIOR SUL
10301 MEDIO TEJO
10302 LEZIRIA DO TEJO
10303 OESTE
10304 GRANDE LISBOA







The starting point for building the manufacturing value-added variable at the NUTS4
level (concelho) were the figures provided in the publication  Contas Nacionais,
produced by the Portuguese Statistical Institute (INE). The last year available is 1994
(which suits the present analysis), while the starting year is 1990 (methodological
changes make it impossible to include previous years in the analysis).
More specifically, the values used contained the total value added data for each
industrial sector, aggregated at the national level. The first step was to divide each of
these figures by the total number of firms in each concelho for each of the years being
considered; this was done in order to get the average value added per firm in each of the
industrial sectors.
After having the individual value-added for each industrial sector for each year, each of
this figures was multiplied by the number of firms from each concelho in each of the
corresponding year and sector. The result is a matrix with the VA figure for each sector
in each of the 84 regions considered for the period 1990-94.
In order to consider together the absolute VA figures and the yearly variation, two sub-
sets of the data were used; the first which was simply a vector containing the absolute
values for 1990; the second represented the rate of change between the base year 1990
and 1994. Next, each element was divided by the average of the correspondent vector,
giving the variation from the mean. This was done in order to reduce both subsets to a
comparable scale. Finally, each of the sectors’ pairs was summed up and divided by
two. The resulting vector was used in the present model under the name “topo_vab”.21
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